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I. INTRODUCTION
The facts of Orlando Dodge, Inc. v. First Union National Bank, a
recent Florida case, provide a useful frame of reference for beginning
this Article.' In Orlando Dodge, Mr. and Mrs. Mirsky purchased a new
car from a franchised dealer.2 Florida's Department of Motor Vehicles
("DMV") issued a certificate of title listing the Mirskys as owners and
their bank as first lienholder. 3 The couple returned the title certificate
and requested that the DMV reverse their names so that Mrs. Mirsky
would appear first on the new certificate. The DMV granted the
couple's request, but, inexplicably, omitted any notation of the bank's
lien on the title.5 The Mirskys took advantage of this error by selling the
car to another dealership and disappearing.6 Prior to purchasing the
couple's car, the dealership confirmed with the DMV that the tide was
clean.7 However, when the dealership sold the couple's car to a cus-
tomer, the DMV revoked the couple's second title certificate and can-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. 661 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
2. See id.
3. See id. As part of their financing arrangement, the couple granted their bank a security
interest in the new car.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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celled the customer's title certificate. 8 The dealership then bought the
car back from its customer and informed the lienor bank of the car's
location, but refused to relinquish possession.9 The lienor bank
responded by suing the second dealer to replevy the car. °
The trial court ruled in favor of the lienor bank." On appeal, the
dealership argued that it ought to be protected because it relied upon the
clean title certificate and its communication with the DMV.12 However,
the court of appeal held in favor of the lienor bank based on the rule that
the first-to-file lienholder prevails over a subsequent bona fide
purchaser.1 3
The decision seems correct under the first-to-perfect rule; however,
both parties have suffered as a result of the negligence of the DMV.
Both parties have had to pay attorney's fees for a trial and an appeal, and
the dealership lost the money it paid the couple for the car, as well. It
appears that two parties, acting in good faith and in strict compliance
with the law, have suffered a loss because of the negligence of some
faceless clerk in the DMV.
This Article analyzes and discusses the statutory provisions and
case law governing a state's responsibility, or lack of responsibility,
when the government negligently files security interests or fails to prop-
erly reveal the names of prior secured creditors to potential lenders or
purchasers. This Article attempts to group states' views under the five
headings in the table of contents, a daunting task because of the variety
of approaches, wording, and indexing methods states use. To further
complicate matters, some states seem to draft their legislation so as to
fool their citizens into thinking that the legislature cares about them,
relying on clever wording in their statutes to shield themselves, their
agencies, and their employees from liability for negligence.
In 1982, the Supreme Court of Mississippi spoke with great confi-
dence on the issue of judicially created sovereign immunity.Y The court
found: "Research reveals that practically all of the states have abrogated
and abolished the sovereign immunity doctrine. The vast majority has
done so completely, some have retained certain prohibitions. There are
only six [including Mississippi] which have not taken any action or have
not clarified their positions."'15 The court then abolished most of
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 324.
13. See id. at 325.
14. See Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
15. Id. at 1047.
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Mississipppi's common law, sovereign immunity rules.
This reform and others like it were very short-lived. This Article
will show that the majority of states, including Mississippi, have legisla-
tively re-established many of their sovereign immunity rules.
II. STATES WHICH WAIVE IMMUNITY FOR ERRORS IN THE
RECORDING PROCESS
The Florida Constitution provides that "[p]rovision may be made
by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now
existing or hereafter originating."' 6 In accordance with this constitu-
tional authority, the Legislature enacted a lengthy statute which states, in
pertinent part, that "[t]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be
liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not
include punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment." 17
The statute then limits liability to not more than $100,000 per person or
$200,000 per incident, unless the Legislature specifically sets a higher
sum in a particular case.18
In an action brought under this statute, a district court of appeal
held that sovereign immunity did not bar an action against a circuit court
clerk who failed to carry out his statutory duty to properly index a
"Notice of Claim of Interest in Land" because of computer operator
error. 9 The court stated that indexing is strictly a ministerial act, rather
than a discretionary act, which would not be covered by the waiver act.2°
In reaching its holding, the court relied heavily on the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City
of Hialeah.2' In Trianon Park, a condominium association sued the City
of Hialeah, alleging that its building inspector negligently inspected a
condominium.22 The Florida Supreme Court reversed a finding of liabil-
ity on the part of the city,23 holding that courts must ascertain the legis-
lative intent, either express or implied, in order to determine whether
particular individuals or classes of individuals are to benefit from a
given statute.2 If the court finds a legislative intent to benefit the public
as a whole, then no duty of care arises as to any particular individual.
16. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
17. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (Supp. 1996).
18. See id.
19. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
20. See id. at 565.
21. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
22. See id. at 915.
23. See id. at 914.
24. See First Am. Title Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d at 564.
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However, if the court finds an intent to benefit a definable class of indi-
viduals, then a duty of care may be found.25
The First American Title court applied this reasoning in its own
decision. It reviewed the statutory provisions defining the clerk's duties:
By statute, the clerk is required to record, index, and maintain
documents relating to real property in the public records of St. Lucie
County, Florida. Indeed, the entire Florida legal scheme regarding
interests in land is predicated on the recording of documents relating
to claims of interests in land. Florida's statutes provide[ ] that "[n]o
conveyance, transfer, or mortgage of real property, or any interest
therein... shall be good and effectual in law or equity against credi-
tors or subsequent purchasers .. .unless the same be recorded
according to law." [They also] provide[ ] that the clerk of the circuit
court is also the county recorder, and... direct[ ] the clerk to record
deeds, leases, mortgages, liens, and "other instruments relating to...
ownership ... [of] real or personal property or any interest in it."
[One section] ... requires the clerk to keep a register with details of
the filing of instruments, in order to ensure the proper maintenance of
the public records. Finally, concerning the claim involved herein,
that section specifically provides that the clerk "[s]hall maintain a
general alphabetical index, direct and inverse, of all instruments filed
for record."26
In First American Title, the clerk conceded that he had a statutory
duty to properly record and index documents, and acknowledged that the
recording statutes generally protect the rights of those claiming an inter-
est in land, including bona fide purchasers of property and creditors of
property owners.27 The clerk asserted, however, that this group was not
the "'definable class of individuals that the statute was designed to pro-
tect"' contemplated by Trianon, so as to give rise to a specific relation-
ship and duty between the clerk and the individual at risk.28 Rather, the
clerk claimed that his duty was the same as the building inspector's in
Trianon.29 The court did not agree.3 °
In a very recent Florida case, Layton v. Florida Department of
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,3 1 a police officer stopped a driver for
driving a car with* a broken taillight. During the stop, the officer
checked with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles ("DHSMV") and discovered that the driver's license had been
25. See id.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. 676 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
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suspended.32 Therefore, the officer arrested the driver.33 The driver was
detained for approximately seventeen hours before being released on her
own recognizance.34 After learning that the DHSMV's records were
incorrect and that her license had not been suspended, she sued the
DHSMV. 5 The trial court and appellate court agreed that the driver had
no cause of action under Florida law.36 The appellate court stated:
We conclude that the maintenance of DHSMV records is a func-
tion undertaken by the government for the public generally and that
the duty to perform this function accurately runs to the public and not
to individual licensed drivers. Accordingly, we hold that the state has
no common law or statutory duty to Layton to accurately maintain
motor vehicle records.37
The Layton court did not cite First American Title's holding that
the clerk had a duty to keep accurate records and that this duty extended,
not just to the public, but to injured individuals as well. Both the Layton
and First American Title courts purportedly followed the Trianon Park
case,38 but they reached opposite results. This is not surprising in light
of the fact that Trianon Park was a four-to-three decision with one
majority opinion, one concurring opinion, and two dissenting opinions.
Although the majority opinion seemed to adopt cases which were
decided prior to the advent of the Florida Tort Claims Statute to circum-
vent the plain wording of the statute, 39 Trianon Park remains a potential
stumbling block in tort claims against the State of Florida and, possibly,
other states which adopt its rationale.
In response to an inquiry from a county attorney regarding filing
under Florida's commercial code, the Florida Attorney General wrote
that a circuit court clerk should file "an originally signed carbon copy of
a document," rather than refuse to file it, because
32. See id. at 1039.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. l at 1041 (citation omitted).
38. See id. at 1039; First An Title Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d at 564-65. In the latest progeny of the
Trianon Park case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has held that the Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles is not liable under section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes for its acts in
the allegedly negligent revocation of the plaintiff's driver's license for a non-existent medical
condition, for failing to recognize that the plaintiff was qualified to drive during the day, and for
failing to reinstate the plaintiffs driving privileges. This result follows that "[b]ecause there has
never been a common law duty of care for the discretionary governmental function of revoking
and renewing drivers' licenses and the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity did not create a
new duty of care .. " Thompson v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 692 So.
2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
39. See Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 923 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); see also id. at 926 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
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the failure to accept and file it might jeopardize priority rights in the
event such a document was later held to constitute a proper filing in
an appropriate proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction. In
such event it may well be that a Clerk could suffer liability for any
damages resulting from the loss of priority rights stemming from the
refusal of the Clerk to file the previously tendered instrument.4"
In a somewhat similar vein, the Attorney General of South Dakota
informed a state's attorney that a register of deeds would be personally
liable if he made errors in the certified answer to a request for informa-
tion regarding the filing of financing statements. The Attorney Gen-
eral also noted that the register of deeds would be protected under a
"combined public officers and employees" bond carried by the county.42
Subsequent to this opinion, South Dakota adopted an interesting
approach to claims against the State for its agents' negligence. The
State enacted legislation allowing the Commission of Administration to
purchase "public liability insurance to the extent and for the purposes
considered expedient by the commissioner for the purpose of insuring
the liability of the state, its officers, agents or employees. 43 If insur-
ance is obtained under this statute, then "[t]o the extent such liability
insurance is purchased... and to the extent coverage is afforded there-
under, the state shall be deemed to have waived the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity and consented to suit in the same manner
that any other party may be sued.""
The South Dakota legislation also provided that if the Commission
does not purchase insurance, "any employee, officer or agent of the
state, while acting within the scope of his employment or agency,
whether such acts are ministerial or discretionary, is immune from suit
or liability for damages brought against him in either his individual or
official capacity.145
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has held that the sections cited
above did not waive sovereign immunity where a county register of
deeds was sued for misfiling documents creating easements on contigu-
ous farm lands causing an abstract company to issue an erroneous
40. Op. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Sery. (Callaghan) 273, 276 (Feb. 3, 1967). But see
Op. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 96, 97-98 (May 4, 1965) ("[tjhe Secretary
of State is required to do more than merely receive and file all statements which are presented for
filing.... [Hie is required to ascertain whether the statement is in proper form and contains the
elements required .... ").
41. See Op. Att'y Gen. of S.D., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802, 803 (Sept. 28, 1967).
42. See id. at 807.
43. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-15 (Michie 1987).
44. Id. § 21-32-16.
45. Id. § 21-32-17.
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abstract of title.46 In the same case, the court also found that a county
was immune from suit because the Legislature did not expressly waive
the county's immunity in these sections.47 However, the sections were
later amended to provide that if a public entity other than the State
purchases liability insurance, then sovereign immunity has been waived
to the extent of the insurance purchased.48
The New York case of 1T Diversified Credit Corp. v. State49
involved an expensive comedy of errors. In that case, the lender, ITT,
requested a certification from the Secretary of State listing all creditors
of "All-Glass Boat Sales, Inc. d/b/a Marlin Marine. 5 ° In response, the
Secretary of State sent a certificate listing three creditors of "The Ameri-
can Felt & Filter Company. 51 ITT wrote letters to each of these credi-
tors.52 One creditor of American Felt replied to ITT that it was not a
creditor of Marlin Marine. 53 ITT' did not seek clarification from the Sec-
retary of State.-' When ITI' suffered a loss as a result of this transaction,
it sued the State of New York. The court concluded that the Secretary of
State and, therefore, the State were negligent in this case.55 However,
the court went on to hold that ITT's loss was attributable to its unreason-
able reliance on the erroneous certificate, because the State's mistake
was obvious upon a mere glance at the certification and one of the
alleged creditors apprised ITT that it had no interest.56 Therefore, it
denied recovery.57
The 177 court relied upon an earlier case,5" Hudleasco, Inc. v.
State.59 The Hudleasco court found that when the Secretary of State of
New York certified the existence of creditors under section 9-407 of
New York's commercial code, he was acting in a purely ministerial
capacity and had a duty to issue certificates in a careful manner knowing
they would be acted upon.' It, therefore, held that negligent issuance of
the certificate was actionable.61 In doing so, it relied on a previous New
46. See Siefkes v. Watertown Title Co., 437 N.W.2d 190, 193 (S.D. 1989).
47. See id.
48. See S.D. CODpmD LAWS § 21-32A-1 (Michie 1987).
49. 454 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1982).
50. See id. at 531.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 532.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 531.
59. 396 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1977), aff'd, 405 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1978).
60. See id. at 1005-06.
61. See id. at 1006.
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York case which imposed liability upon the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles for issuing certificates of title without noting the foreign liens on the
subject vehicles. 2
The same result would be reached in a case involving domestic
liens. For example, when a lender's lien is properly noted on a Michi-
gan certificate of title for a car, which is later removed to New York, and
the owner surrenders the Michigan certificate to the New York Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles in exchange for a new certificate, the Michigan
lien creditor is protected if the New York clerk fails to note the Michi-
gan lien on the new title certificate and the debtors go into bankruptcy.63
It appears that in Ohio the county recorder and his surety also
would be liable to persons requesting written certifications regarding the
filing of financing statements.
[U]pon the tender of the fee provided, a ministerial duty is imposed
upon the county recorder.., to examine the indexes and files of his
office and to issue a written certificate as to whether said public
records contain any financing statements in relation to one particular
debtor which are effective in that they were filed within the time
period prescribed .... but the county recorder is not required or
permitted ... to issue his interpretation or opinion as to the legal
effect of such filings; and that upon the failure of the county recorder
to fully list all such financing statements he and his surety are liable
to a person for damages resulting from such omission.'
A somewhat similar view was expressed by an Ohio court of
appeals. In Maddox v. Astro Investments,65 the county court clerk filed a
judgment lien against real property on May 23, 1973, but did not index it
until June 4, 1973.66 In the meantime, a party relied upon the records to
determine whether there was a lien and, not finding one, closed tide on
the property. 67 The Maddox court held the clerk liable for his negli-
gence, never mentioning a waiver of sovereign immunity.6 8
Approximately six years after Maddox, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held, in accordance with a 1976 statute in which Ohio waived its sover-
eign immunity and consented to being sued in the Ohio Court of
Claims,69 that claimants in Ohio could now sue the State for negligence
when the Secretary of State overlooked a properly filed security interest
62. See id. (citing Exchange National Bank v. State, 388 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1976)).
63. See In re Beaudoin, 160 B.R. 25 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993).
64. Op. Att'y Gen. of Ohio, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 768, 773-74 (Sept. 19, 1962)
(emphasis added).
65. 343 N.E.2d 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
66. See id. at 134-35.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 136-37.
69. See Otuo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1996).
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and issued a written statement incorrectly assuring the claimant that a
certain party did not have any security interests filed against it.70 The
court noted, however, that under the revised statute, the claimant waives
his claim against the state officer who committed the negligent act by
filing a suit against the State.
III. STATES WHICH CLAIM IMMUNITY FOR ERRORS IN THE "ISSUANCE
OF CERTIFICATES" AND FOR "MISREREESENTATIONS"
IN CERTIFICATES
The adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act 7 began the drive for
states to waive their sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act
provides that "[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provi-
sions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. ' 72 It gives
the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over
civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.73
The broad scope of this waiver, however, is drastically curtailed by
exceptions for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false impris-
onment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. '74
In light of the exceptions for "misrepresentation" and "deceit," it
should come as no surprise that the government is immune from suit for
negligent or intentional misrepresentations. 75 Courts have interpreted
the term "misrepresentation" to include both acts of commission and
omission. 76
A problem arises when it is unclear whether the alleged wrongful
act should be labelled a "misrepresentation." For example, in Saraw
Partnership v. United States,77 the plaintiff, Saraw, was in the business
of acquiring foreclosed homes from the Veterans Administration
70. See Scot Lad Foods, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 418 N.E.2d 1368, 1375 (Ohio 1981).
71. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1994).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
73. Id. § 1346(b).
74. Id. § 2680(h) (emphasis added).
75. See Williamson v. USDA, 815 F.2d 368, 377 (5th Cir. 1987).
76. See, e.g., McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 1993).
77. 67 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 1995).
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("VA"), repairing them, and then selling them for profit.78 Saraw gave
the VA promissory notes for nine properties.79 The VA assigned each
property a separate loan number, but only sent coupon payment forms to
Saraw for eight of the properties.8" Saraw continued to make payments
on the ninth property, but the VA did not credit the payments to the
correct account and foreclosed on the property. 8' When Saraw sued the
VA for its negligent handling of his account, the trial court held in favor
of the VA on the grounds that the alleged negligence was actually a
misrepresentation and that, therefore, the VA was immune from suit.82
The court of appeals reversed, stating that: "The erroneous keypunch
for Loan #28541 was the causa sine qua non for all the problems that
followed. This case is not about reliance on faulty information or on the
lack of proper information; rather, the gist of this case is the govern-
ment's careless handling of Saraw's loan payments. 83 It found that
"[w]here there is no detrimental reliance on an alleged miscommunica-
tion, no claim for misrepresentation is made. 84
The United States Supreme Court has drawn a subtle line between
"negligent misrepresentation" and "negligent inspection" which results
in a "negligent misrepresentation." The Supreme Court defined "negli-
gent misrepresentation" in United States v. Neustadt.85 In Neustadt, a
married couple purchased a sixteen-year-old house which appeared to be
in excellent condition.86 The Federal Housing Administration ("FHA")
inspected the house and issued a favorable report.8 7 Soon after the
couple moved into the house, the house developed extensive cracking in
the walls and ceilings. 8 Contractors drilled a hole through the basement
floor and discovered that the house was built on clay, which became
slippery when wet. The foundation shifted on this slippery clay, causing
the cracking in the walls and ceiling.89 The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the crux of the plaintiffs' claim was the FHA's negligent misrepre-
sentation of the condition of the home and, therefore, the "misrepresen-
tation" exception to the sovereign immunity waiver barred suit against
78. See id. at 568.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 568-69.
82. See id. at 569.
83. Id. at 570-71 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 571; see also Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013, 1016 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975)
(discussing cases defining misrepresentation).
85. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
86. See id. at 698-99.
87. See id. at 698.
88. See id. at 700.
89. See id.
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the government.90
Years later, in Block v. Neal,91 the Supreme Court narrowed its
reading of "misrepresentation." In Block, the plaintiff hired a contractor
to erect a prefabricated home and obtained a loan from the Farmers
Home Administration ("FmHA") to purchase the home. 92 The construc-
tion contract required that the plans, workmanship, and materials con-
form to FmHA standards.93 The FmHA conducted three inspections
prior to the plaintiff moving in and approved the home. 94 However,
after the plaintiff moved in, the FmHA made further inspections and
discovered fourteen major defects.95 When the plaintiff sued the FmHA,
the Court held that the complaint primarily alleged "negligent inspec-
tion" by the original inspector and, therefore, the negligent misrepresen-
tation exclusion would not immunize the government from suit. 96
Justice Marshall explained:
In this case, unlike Neustadt, the Government's misstatements are not
essential to plaintiff's negligence claim. The Court of Appeals found
that to prevail under the Good Samaritan doctrine, [the plaintiff] must
show that FmHA officials voluntarily undertook to supervise con-
struction of her house; that the officials failed to use due care in car-
rying out their supervisory activity; and that she suffered some
pecuniary injury proximately caused by FmHA's failure to use due
care. FmHA's duty to use due care to ensure that the builder adhere
to previously approved plans and cure all defects before completing
construction is distinct from any duty to use due care in communicat-
ing information to respondent. And it certainly does not "appea[r]
beyond doubt" that the only damages alleged in the complaint to be
caused by FmHA's conduct were those attributable to [the plaintiff's]
reliance on FmHA inspection reports. [The plaintiff's] factual allega-
tions would be consistent with proof at trial that Home Marketing
would never have turned the house over to [the plaintiff] in its defec-
tive condition if FmHA officials had pointed out defects to the
builder while construction was still underway, rejected defective
materials and workmanship, or withheld final payment until the
builder corrected all defects.9 7
Justice Marshall's words display many of the subtleties of common
law pleading. These subtleties can destroy what Congress creates.
90. See id. at 711.
91. 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
92. See id. at 291.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 292.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 297.
97. Id. at 297-98 (citation and footnote omitted).
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Because most negligent misrepresentations are preceded or accompanied
by an act of negligence, every diligent pleader should focus on such
negligence and disregard the misrepresentation aspect. 98
In 1985, California enacted a very narrowly focused legislative
response to the problem the Introduction to this Article posed about state
responsibility for misinformation.99 The code provision provides:
The Department of Motor Vehicles is liable for any injury to a
lienholder or good faith purchaser of a vehicle proximately caused by
the department's negligent omission of the lienholder's name from an
ownership certificate issued by the department. The liability of the
department under this section shall not exceed the actual cash value
of the vehicle." °
98. The crux of this argument is that a plaintiff's ability to sue the government turns on her
ability to persuade the court that the cause of action lies in negligence, not misrepresentation. For
example, where the FmHA failed to warn prospective purchasers of a house of a defective heater,
and the heater caught fire, killing a child, section 2680(h)'s "misrepresentation" exclusion would
not protect the government because there was no misrepresentation to the purchasers. See McNeil
v. United States, 897 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Tex. 1995). In McNeil, the plaintiffs focused on the
FmHA's failure to act, not the wrongful representation. See id. at 311-12.
McNeil should be compared with Schneider v. United, States, 936 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1991).
In Schneider, plaintiffs bought factory-built houses with financing from the FmHA and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). HUD did not supervise construction
of these houses, but it did conduct semi-annual inspections of the manufacturer's factory. See id
at 957-58. Although the plans and specifications called for a certain type of "sheathing paper,"
the manufacturer used the wrong kind, causing moisture to get inside the walls and the sheathing
to rot. When the plaintiffs sued the United States, the United States argued that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) barred actions for "misrepresentation." See id. at 958. The trial court and the court of
appeals agreed that the "misrepresentation" defense barred the plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 963.
The appellate court compared the Block and Neustadt cases to the case before it:
The plaintiffs in the case before us, unlike the plaintiff in Block, have alleged
no claim for negligent supervision of the construction of [the] houses. Indeed, at
oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff specifically stated the inspection of [the
manufacturer's factory approximately two times per year for two to three hours by a
HUD official was "irrelevant" to the disposition of this case. Unlike Block, ours is a
case where the government's misstatements are essential to the plaintiffs' claims: In
order for [the manufacturer] to have been able to sell houses to the plaintiffs that
were eligible for government financing, HUD had to issue a Regional Letter of
Acceptance listing those... houses that had been approved. The plaintiffs relied on
the misstatement in this Letter of Acceptance that the... houses were constructed in
accordance with government standards ... and unlike the plaintiff in Block, have
not alleged separate facts which would establish a duty independent of the
misrepresentation exception. Thus, the plaintiffs' reliance on Block is without
merit.
Our case is like Neustadt, where plaintiffs who relied on misinformation in a
government document when making their decision to purchase a home were found
to have stated claims that fell within the misrepresentation exception. In our case it
is clear that the plaintiffs would not have been harmed but for the misinformation
that was communicated through the Regional Letter of Acceptance.
Id. at 761.
99. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 818.5 (West 1996).
100. Id.
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The historical note to this statute declares that the Legislature
intended "that the provisions of Section 818.5 of the Government Code
not be construed as establishing any precedent for creating state liability
in any other situation or circumstance."' 01
It seems clear from this statement of legislative intent that the Cali-
fornia courts should not extend the waiver statute to reach the Secretary
of State in the event his office negligently misfiles a financing
statement.10 2
Another California statute provides: "A public employee acting in
the scope of his employment is not liable for an injury caused by his
misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or
intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud, corruption or actual mal-
ice." 10 3 According to the Attorney General of California, the above stat-
ute, which resembles the Federal Tort Claims Act, would protect the
Secretary of State from liability for negligent or intentional misrepresen-
tation, absent fraud, corruption, or actual malice, committed in the pro-
cess of furnishing information regarding the filing of financing
statements." In addition, he stated that even if a court held that this
statute did not protect the Secretary of State, other statutes which require
the State to defend any employee for acts committed within the scope of
his or her employment would protect the Secretary. 0 5
In addition to the "misrepresentation" defense, California has
adopted the "issue" defense, which immunizes officials from liability for
purely discretionary acts. Section 818.4 of the California Statutes
provides:
A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance,
denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization where the pubic entity or an
employee of the public entity is authorized by enactment to determine
whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied, sus-
101. Id. at historical and statutory notes.
102. Prior to the adoption of section 818.5 above, a California appellate court held that when
the Department of Motor Vehicles mistakenly certified that a stolen car was titled properly in the
name of an individual, the state was not liable to an innocent purchaser because of three statutes:
section 821.2, providing that a public employee was not liable for injury resulting from the
issuance of items such as certificates; section 818.4, providing that a public entity was not liable
for injury resulting from the issuance of items such as certificates; and section 818.8, providing
that a public entity was not liable for an injury resulting from misrepresentation by an entity
employee, regardless of whether such misrepresentation was negligent or intentional. See Hirsch
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 115 Cal. Rptr. 452, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
103. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 822.2 (West 1996).
104. See Op. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 92, 94-95 (Feb. 19, 1965).
105. See id. at 95.
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pended or revoked. 106
In light of section 818.4, what happens if the State of California
fails to revoke a bus company's operating authority when the company
fails to carry liability insurance as required by California law? Is the
State immune from liability on the grounds that the failure to revoke is
discretionary rather than mandatory? A California court of appeals has
held that when the State has a mandatory duty to act, any failure to act is
not protected under section 818.4.107
In a somewhat similar vein, the California Supreme Court held that
the "issue" defense would not bar an injured worker from suing a county
for issuing a contractor a building permit without first ensuring he had
the required workmen's compensation insurance.10 8 It stated that the
government is protected only when its duty to issue, or revoke, is
discretionary. 0 9
It is interesting to note that although New Jersey's applicable stat-
ute contains wording identical to California's section 814.4, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has held that "issuance" and "revocation" trigger
immunity, regardless of whether they are characterized as mandatory or
discretionary acts." 0
This "mandatory"/"discretionary" dichotomy should be kept in
mind when reading other states' statutes in this section and predicting
what these states will do when these issues arise.
Utah's statute affords both a "misrepresentation" and an "issuance"
exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. It provides, in pertinent
part:
Immunity from suit of all government entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises
out of...
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, cer-
tificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; ...
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional .... 111
Metropolitan Finance Co. v. State involved an earlier version of
this statute." 2 In Metropolitan Finance, a car owner obtained a title
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.4 (West 1996).
107. See Elson v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 312-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
108. See Morris v. County of Marin, 55 P.2d 606, 616-17 (Cal. 1977).
109. See id. at 613-14.
110. See supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
111. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
112. 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986).
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certificate from the State. The State later issued a duplicate certificate of
title to the same owner. A third party then presented the original title
certificate to a potential lender who agreed to finance the loan after the
third party somehow produced a new certificate of title in the third
party's name and listing the lender as a secured party.'1 3 Of course, the
third party did not repay the loan, and the lender could not recover the
car or the amount of the loan from the third party.114 The lender then
sued the State, alleging that State Tax Commission employees negli-
gently issued the second car title in the name of the third party and
conspired to defraud the lender of its funds. 1 5 The Supreme Court of
Utah held that the State, the State Tax Commission, and its employees
were immune from suit under the statute discussed above.,1 6
Mississippi has recently adopted modified immunity provisions' 1 7
which contain an "issuance" exemption similar to that found in Utah.
The statute provides that a governmental entity will be exempt from
liability in circumstances
[alrising out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any privilege,
ticket, pass, permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar
authorization where the governmental entity or its employee is
authorized by law to determine whether or not such authorization
should be issued, denied, suspended or revoked unless such issuance,
denial, suspension or revocation, or failure or refusal thereof, is of a
malicious or arbitrary and capricious nature. 118
The Mississippi Supreme Court abolished most of the sovereign
immunity rules in Pruett v. City of Rosedale,"9 but the legislature re-
established most of them. 120 Mississippi's Supreme Court then held the
rules unconstitutional.1 2' The concept of sovereign immunity was not
gone for long, however. It showed a remarkable rebirth just three years
later in Robinson v. Stewart.1 22 A more recent case, Mohundro v. Alcorn
113. See id. at 293.
114. See id. at 293-94.
115. See id. at 294.
116. A subsequent Utah case held that a government employee who commits fraud in the
course of her employment may be held liable even though her government employer may be
immune. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-
4(4)).
117. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp. 1996).
118. Id. at § 11-46-9(1)(h).
119. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
120. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 (1987) (unconstitutional) (directing state courts to apply
common law sovereign immunity rules).
121. See Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Miss. 1992).
122. 655 So. 2d 866, 868-69 (Miss. 1995).
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County,123 attempts to synthesize the preceeding cases, and others, into a
coherent mass. It is sad to compare the jubilant demise of sovereign
immunity in Presley with the now continuing rule of general sovereign
immunity in Mohundro.
Arizona follows, in part, California's concept of qualified immu-
nity. Its statute provides:
Unless a public employee acting within the scope of his employment
intended to cause injury or was grossly negligent, neither a public
entity nor a public employee is liable for ... [t]he issuance of or
failure to revoke or suspend any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order or similar authorization for which absolute immunity is not pro-
vided pursuant to § 12-820.0 102
Under this statute, it appears that if the Secretary of State or other
state officer issued a certificate which mistakenly stated that there were
no prior financing statements filed against a debtor or that there were no
liens on an automobile, the State would not be liable, and the officer
would only be liable if he or she intended to cause injury or was grossly
negligent.
Prior to the adoption of the above statute, an Arizona appellate
court held both a State inspector and the State liable, despite the inspec-
tor's lack of intent or gross negligence, where the inspector mistakenly
certified that three motor homes were represented by paperwork when in
fact they were stolen vehicles.1" Under the qualified immunity statute,
however, it appears that only the inspector would be liable, and then
only if his error was grossly negligent or intentionally injurious.
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act'26 should be a model for any
drafters who desire a "waiver of sovereign immunity" act which waives
hardly any immunities. The extensive legislative findings section
presents a rigid concept of tort liability which is, perhaps, summarized
as follows: "The General Assembly in this chapter intends to grant the
State, its political subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the
scope of official duty, immunity from liability and suit for any tort
except as waived by this chapte." 1 27
Not content with this restrictive approach, the section continues:
"[tihe provisions of this chapter... must be liberally construed in favor
of limiting the liability of the State.'
' 28
123. 675 So. 2d 848, 851-53 (Miss. 1996).
124. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.02(A)(5) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
125. See Bill Moore Motor Homes, Inc. v. State, 629 P.2d 1025, 1027, 1031 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981).
126. See S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
127. See id. § 15-78-20(b).
128. Id. § 15-78-20(0. This is a strange use of the term "liberally construed."
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Finally, the Act presents thirty-one exceptions to the waiver of
immunity, including one seen in states previously discussed.
The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from...
licensing powers or functions including, but not limited to, the issu-
ance, denial, suspension, renewal, or revocation of or failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, renew, or revoke any permit, license,
certificate, approval, registration, order, or similar authority except
when the power or function is exercised in a grossly negligent
manner.
129
West Virginia law contains the "misrepresentation" concepts seen
in both California and Utah. The relevant statute provides that "[a]
political subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results
from . . .[m]isrepresentation, if unintentional. 130 It also declares that
employees of a political subdivision are immune from liability unless:
(1) His or her acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of
employment or official responsibilities;
(2) His or her acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or
(3) Liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a provision
of this code. 3'
However, this employee immunity "does not affect or limit any liability
of a political subdivision for an act or omission of the employee."' 32
It should be noted that in West Virginia "political subdivision"
means any county commission, municipality, county board of education,
but the word "'[s]tate' does not include political subdivisions."1 33 This
statute is a subtle way of stating that West Virgina has retained the con-
cept of sovereign immunity set forth in its constitution. Its constitution
provides:
The State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any
court of law or equity, except the State of West Virginia, including
any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, or any officer,
agent, or employee thereof, may be made defendant in any garnish-
ment or attachment proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee.
1 34
At first blush, the State of Oklahoma articulates a broad array of
immunity waivers, providing that:
A. The state or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss result-
ing from its torts or the torts of its employees acting within the scope
129. Id. § 15-78-60(12) (emphasis added).
130. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(12) (1992).
131. Id. § 29-12A-5(b).
132. Id. § 29-12A-5(c).
133. Id. § 29-12A-3(c), (e).
134. W. VA. CONsT. art. 6, § 35.
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of their employment subject to the limitations and exceptions speci-
fied in this act and only where the state or political subdivision, if a
private person or entity, would be liable for money damages under
the laws of this state. The state or a political subdivision shall not be
liable under the provisions of this act for any act or omission of an
employee acting outside the scope of his employment.
B. The liability of the state or political subdivision under this act
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the state, a
political subdivision or employee at common law or otherwise.
135
However, a subsequent section then narrows this broad waiver by
disclaiming any liability of the state or political subdivisions in claims
resulting from thirty-one areas, including:
12. Licensing powers or functions including, but not limited to, the
issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of or failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authority;
17. Misrepresentation, if unintentional;
31. Any confirmation of the existence or nonexistence of any effec-
tive financing statement on file in the office of the Secretary of State
made in good faith by an employee of the office of the Secretary of
State as required by [law]. 136
The Georgia Code features the "issuance" concept found in a
number of states. The concept immunizes the State from liability for
losses which are the result of the State's "[1]icensing powers or func-
tions, including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension, or
revocation of or the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization."" 7
In 1978, Massachusetts adopted a fairly liberal waiver of immu-
nity,'3 8 but in 1993, it narrowed it by adding that the State would not be
liable for "any claim based upon the issuance, denial, suspension or rev-
ocation or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any per-
mit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization." '139 As
a result of this amendment, it appears that no state officer or office will
be responsible for certificates under the commercial code or the motor
135. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 153 (West 1988).
136. Id. § 155 (emphasis added). In view of subsections 12 and 17, subsection 31 seems to be
in the nature of overkill. It is also interesting to observe that subsection 31 does not contain a
reference to motor vehicle title certificates.
137. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-24 (1994) (emphasis added).
138. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, §§ 1-13 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
139. Id. § 10 (emphasis added).
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vehicle laws. Unfortunately, there appear to be no Massachusetts cases
interpreting this amendment.
Tennessee's general rule is that all governmental entities are
exempt from suit, except as otherwise provided.140 Tennessee then
waives immunity in cases in which employees, acting within the scope
of their employment, proximately cause injury through their negligent
acts or omissions, unless the injury:
(3) Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization.
(6) Arises out of misrepresentation by an employee whether or not
such is negligent or intentional.1 4
1
Tennessee has thus joined other states in protecting state employees
and officers from liability for misrepresentations and errors in the issu-
ance of certificates.
Even without the aid of the above statutes, the Tennessee courts
have tended to immunize government employees from liability for such
errors. In First Tennessee Bank National Ass'n v. Jones,142 for example,
a bank financed the purchase of a Mercedes on the strength of a Tennes-
see certificate of title. Later, the car was forfeited to the State on the
grounds that it was stolen. The bank then sought relief from the State.
The court held that the certificate of tifle is not a guarantee of title and
that the lending bank should have been able to discern that the car was
stolen. 143
Nebraska has adopted its own version of the "issuance" and "mis-
representation" defenses. It makes the State Tort Claims Act inapplica-
ble to:
(4) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights; ...
(8) Any claim based upon the issuance, denial, suspension, or revo-
cation of or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any
permit, license, certificate, or order. Such claim shall also not be
filed against a state employee acting within the scope of his or her
office. ' "
In addition, the motor vehicles portion of the Nebraska statutes
immunizes counties and county employees from liability for acts relat-
140. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201 (Supp. 1996).
141. Id. § 29-20-205 (1980) (emphasis added).
142. 732 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
143. See id. at 282-85.
144. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-8,219(4)-(8) (1996) (emphasis added).
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ing to motor vehicle registration. 45
The above sections indicate that the State of Nebraska and its
employees are not responsible for even a deliberate, deceitful misrepre-
sentation in any certificate issued under the commercial code. In other
words, the king can do no wrong.
In contrast to Nebraska, Indiana has taken a more balanced
approach. It makes its employees, acting within the scope of employ-
ment, immune only for issuance pursuant to their discretionary authority
and for purely unintentional misrepresentation.1 46 Although the issu-
ance of a certificate under the commercial code is ministerial rather than
discretionary, if the misrepresentation is unintentional, then both the
State and the employee are still immune from suit.
The Indiana Legislature may have enacted the immunity statute
because several court cases indicated Indiana officials were in dire need
of protection. In 1978, for example, the Court of Appeals of Indiana
held that the Secretary of State and the Director of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Division may be liable for failing to inform a prospective
lender of the existence of a security interest in a mobile home dealer's
inventory.1 47 The court noted, however, that the officials "may never-
theless be sheltered from liability because the act complained of was
performed by an assistant or other subordinate employee" and remanded
for a determination of whether that was in fact the case.148 Another case
decided the same year held that the Commissioner of Indiana's Bureau
of Motor Vehicles was liable for negligently issuing a certificate of title
for a car, which failed to indicate that the vehicle was subject to a
lien.149 The court held the Commissioner liable for the amount of the
omitted lien.150
Idaho takes a bifurcated approach to the "misrepresentation" and
"issuance" exceptions to liability. It first immunizes any "governmental
entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of
their employment and without malice or criminal intent" from claims
145. See id. § 60-302.04 (1993). Nebraska has taken steps to reduce errors relating to motor
vehicle registration. It has mandated that counties, and the Departments of Motor Vehicles and
Administration formulate a plan to computerize the state's motor vehicle registration system. See
id. § 60-106(1).
146. See IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3 (West Supp. 1996).
147. See Mobile Enters., Inc. v. Conrad, 380 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
148. Id. (citing Salem Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitcomb, 362 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977);
see also Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. Wedel, 489 N.E.2d 1203 (Ind. CL App. 1986)
(involving an obvious error committed by the Indiana Secretary of State's office while giving
information about existence of financing statement in records).
149. See VanNatta v. Crites, 381 N.E.2d 532, 534-37 (Ind. CL App. 1978).
150. See id. at 538-39.
[Vol. 51:11091128
1997] COMMERCIAL CODES AND MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS
arising out of misrepresentation. 5 ' Then it immunizes these same gov-
ernment agencies and employees for any action arising "out of the issu-
ance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue,
deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, approval, order or
similar authorization," absent "gross negligence or reckless, willful and
wanton conduct."1 52 When these two exceptions are read together, it
appears that the State will not be liable for employees' grossly negligent
oral misrepresentations, but may be liable if the same misrepresentations
are in writing.
Vermont's law is consistent with that seen in other states with
"misrepresentation" exceptions. Although the State may be liable for
many torts,1 53 it cannot be liable for "[a]ny claim arising out of alleged
assault, battery, abuse of process, misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, or
interference with contractual rights."1 54
A relatively recent amendment to the Vermont statutes appears to
eliminate any cause of action against a state employee who is guilty of
simple negligence. The new statute provides:
(a) When the act or omission of an employee of the state acting
within the scope of employment is believed to have caused damage to
property, injury to persons, or death, the exclusive right of action
shall lie against the state of Vermont; and no such action may be
maintained against the employee or the estate of the employee.
(b) This section does not apply to gross negligence or willful
misconduct.1 55
Prior to this amendment, a lower-level state employee may have
been liable for ministerial mistakes while working, including giving
misinformation.' 56
Hawaii is another state with an initially broad waiver of immunity
for torts. It waives "its immunity for liability for the torts of its employ-
ees and shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."' 57 However, a sub-
sequent section contracts this wide waiver by making an exception for
claims "arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresenta-
151. IDAHO CODE § 6-904(3) (1990).
152. Id. § 6-904B(3) (emphasis added).
153. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 5601(a) (Supp. 1996).
154. Id. § 5601(e)(6) (emphasis added).
155. Id. § 5602.
156. See Curran v. Marcille, 565 A.2d 1362, 1363 (Vt. 1989); Levinsky v. Diamond, 559 A.2d
1073, 1078 (Vt. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Muzzy v. State, 503 A.2d 82 (Vt. 1990) and
Libercent v. Aldrich, 539 A.2d 981, 984 (Vt. 1987).
157. HAw. Rav. STAT. A N. § 662-2 (Michie 1995).
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tion, deceit, or interference with contract rights."15 8
The "misrepresentation" notion was involved in a rather strange
way in the case of Fogarty v. State.1 59 The Fogartys were guarantors of
promissory notes a corporation issued to the State and County of
Hawaii."6 A state officer cancelled the notes without authorization
from the county.1 6 The county sued the Fogartys. Once a settlement
was reached, the Fogartys sued the State for indemnification for the
amount of the settlement. The court held that, although the Fogartys'
tort claim was barred, the statutory misrepresentation defense would not
bar the Fogartys' breach of warranty claim against the State. 62
Although this sophisticated way of avoiding the statute was a just result,
it should not be extended to cases in which State employees, through
simple negligence, fail to reveal the existence of secured parties on a car
title or security interests under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Because Hawaii is composed of islands, registration of car titles is
done on a county-by-county basis. If a car is imported from another
state or county, an application for registration must be made to the direc-
tor of finance of the particular county. The law provides that:
The acceptance by the director of finance of a certificate of title or of
registration issued by another state or county, as hereinabove pro-
vided, in the absence of knowledge that the certificate is forged,
fraudulent, or void, shall be a sufficient determination of the genuine-
ness and regularity of the certificate and of the truth of the recitals
therein, and no liability shall be incurred by any officer or employee
of the director of finance by reason of so accepting the certificate. 63
New Jersey enacted a Tort Claims Act'6 which provides for
"immunity with exceptions rather than liability with exceptions."1 65
This "immunity approach" is clear in the following sections:
§ 59:2-1. Immunity of public entity generally
a. Except as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not
liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omis-
sion of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
b. Any liability of a public entity established by this act is subject to
158. Id. § 662-15 (emphasis added).
159. 705 P.2d 72 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
160. See id. at 74.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 77.
163. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 286-41(c) (Michie 1996).
164. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to :12-3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
165. Jennifer Bros. v. Borough of Highlands, 428 A.2d 528, 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1, cmt.; Burg v. State, 371 A.2d 308, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1977).
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any immunity of the public entity and is subject to any defenses that
would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.
§ 59:2-2. Liability of public entity
a. A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or
omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances.
b. A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or
omission of a public employee where the public employee is not
liable."6
Another section of the act further strengthens New Jersey's "immu-
nity approach" by providing that
[a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance,
denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization where the public entity or
public employee is authorized by law to determine whether or not
such authorization should be issued, denied, suspended or revoked. 167
Under a subsequent statute, public employees are likewise immune
from suit for errors made during activities such as denial, suspension, or
revocation of licenses.1 61 Public employees are also not liable for mis-
representation while acting within the scope of employment.1 69
Malloy v. State170 applied these statutes. In Malloy, the plaintiff
passed the examination for a real estate agent's license, but due to a
clerical error, the State sent him a written notice that he had failed.1 71
Over a year later, the State notified him of the error, and he sued the
State."' The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the State is not liable
under section 59:2-5 for clerical errors regardless of whether they are
ministerial or discretionary. 73 The court noted that if section 59:2-5
was limited to discretionary acts, it would be surplusage, because a prior
section 174 immunizes the State for any injury resulting from its exercise
of discretion. 175
On the other hand, in 1984, New Jersey enacted the Boat Owner-
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1 to -2. (footnote omitted).
167. Id. § 59:2-5. The comment to this section states that public entities' almost unlimited
exposure justifies this immunity. See id. at cmt.
168. See id. § 59:3-6 (West 1992).
169. See id. § 59:3-10.
170. 388 A.2d 622 (NJ. 1978).
171. See id. at 623.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 625-26.
174. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3 (West 1992).
175. See Malloy, 388 A.2d at 625.
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ship Certificate Act, 76 which provides for the issuance of title certifi-
cates (and security interests) for marine equipment.1 77 Under this act:
The director, his agents and employees of the Division of Motor
Vehicles in the Department of Law and Public Safety or the agency
or instrumentality of the State that may process certificates of owner-
ship, registrations and associated functions shall not incur any per-
sonal liability in carrying out the provisions of this section or in
furnishing any information provided herein from the records of the
State.1
7 8
In addition to responsibility for boats, New Jersey charges the
Department of Motor Vehicles with the responsibility of recording and
disclosing security interests in motor vehicles, but shields "[t]he direc-
tor, his agents, and employees of the Division of Motor Vehicles from
any personal liability" for carrying out their duties. 79
IV. STATES WHICH MAY HAVE WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR ERRORS IN
THE RECORDING PROCESS OR IMPOSED LIABILITY
ON STATE EMPLOYEES
Arkansas takes a very hard line on governmental immunity by
declaring it to be
the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all counties, municipal
corporations, school districts, special improvement districts, and all
other political subdivisions of the state shall be immune from liability
and from suit for damages, except to the extent that they may be
covered by liability insurance. No tort action shall lie against any
such political subdivision because of the acts of its agents and
employees. 180
The reference to liability insurance in the above statute is explained
by another statute which requires all political subdivisions to either carry
liability insurance on their motor vehicles or become self-insurers.' 8'
State employees covered by other insurance are not immune from
suit.' 82 In the absence of insurance, public officials are immune from
tort liability for negligent performance of their duties, but they are per-
sonally liable for intentional torts. 83
176. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:7A-1 to -29 (West Supp. 1997).
177. The Act defines "marine equipment" as a "newly manufactured vessel, or hull greater
than twelve feet in length." Id. § 12:7A-3.o.
178. Id. § 12:7A-15.e.
179. Id. § 39:10-14.E (West 1990).
180. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (Michie 1996); see also ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20; Tri-B
Adver. Inc. v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 539 S.W.2d 430 (Ark. 1976).
181. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-303(a) (Michie 1996).
182. See Deitsch v. Tillery, 833 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Ark. 1992).
183. See Battle v. Harris, 766 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Ark. 1989).
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In Arkansas, state officers and employees are immune from indi-
vidual liability for negligent performance of acts within the scope of
their employment to the extent that these officers and employees are not
covered by liability insurance. 184
Minnesota has waived most claims of sovereign immunity with a
"general rule" which provides that
[t]he state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by an act or omission of an employee
of the state while acting within the scope of office or employment...
under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant, whether arising out of a governmental or pro-
prietary function. Nothing in this section waives the defense of judi-
cial or legislative immunity except to the extent provided in
subdivision 8.185
Because the waiver exclusions do not have any express or implied
connection with liability for the mishandling of security interests or mis-
representation, it appears that the State would be liable for such ministe-
rial errors.
Montana's waiver of sovereign immunity is covered under the
expansive title "Liability Exposure and Insurance Coverage."" 6 Under
its Act, "[e]very governmental entity is subject to liability for its torts
and those of its employees acting within the scope of their employment
or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function
except as specifically provided by the legislature."1I8 7
Legislative immunity from suit seems confined mainly to legisla-
tive acts and omissions inapplicable to state officers and employees. 188
The Act provides for insurance coverage and pooling, 89 as well as the
bonding of state officers and employees for not only the defalcation of
funds, but also "neglect, default, or misconduct in office of any deputy,
clerk, or employee appointed or employed by such principal."19 0
Because there are no cases imposing liability for the negligent giving of
information regarding security interests, it appears that the bonding pro-
vision for neglect gives recourse, to the extent of the bond, to anyone
suffering losses from such negligence.
Under Nevada's waiver of sovereign immunity, the State may be
liable for a clerical error in the recording and reporting of security inter-
184. See Carter v. Bush, 753 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ark. 1988).
185. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736, subd. 1 (West Supp. 1997).
186. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-101 to -805 (1995).
187. Id. § 2-9-102.
188. Id. § 2-9-111.
189. See id. §§ 2-9-201 to -212.
190. Id. § 2-9-504(1) to (2).
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ests. 19' Unfortunately, there appear to be no cases to this effect. In Pitt-
man v. Lower Court Counseling,"2 however, the Nevada Supreme Court
held that a municipal court clerk has a duty to properly maintain the
official documents submitted to the clerk and if his failure to do so
results in wrongful imprisonment of an accused, the State will be liable
for damages.' 9 3 The court expressly followed a prior case which held
that it was the district court clerk's duty to keep an accurate record of the
date he received every document, including notices of appeal.1 94
Nevada has enacted a special statute dealing with errors made while
registering motor vehicles, recording security interests, and giving infor-
mation regarding these matters. It immunizes the Department of Motor
Vehicles and its employees from liability for such errors.' 95
In Connecticut, almost all claims against the state must be filed
with the Office of the Claims Commissioner.' 96 The Commissioner may
make awards not exceeding $7500.197 If the amount of the claim
exceeds $7500, the Commissioner may make a recommendation to the
General Assembly to pay the award.1 98 The Commissioner may also
authorize suit against the State. 199 Remarkably, there has been very lit-
tle litigation since Connecticut began following this procedure in 1959.
Although there do not appear to be any Connecticut cases involving
misfiling, misindexing, or misinforming, and security interests, this kind
of claim would probably fall within the definition of "just Claim," that
is, "a claim which in equity and justice the state should pay, provided
the state has caused damage or injury or has received a benefit. '200
Alaska's tort claims statute resembles the Federal Torts Claims
Statute in that it states that a claim may not be brought if the claim
is an action for tort, and is based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the state, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation . . .or is an action for tort, and based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a state agency or an employee
of the state, whether or not the discretion involved is abused. 20 1
The ministerial, negligent acts of non-filing, misfiling, or misindex-
191. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.0305-.039 (Michie 1996).
192. 871 P.2d 953 (Nev. 1994).
193. See id. at 956.
194. See id. (citing Huebner v. State, 810 P.2d 1209 (Nev. 1991)).
195. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 482.434 (Michie 1994).
196. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-142 (West Supp. 1997).
197. See id. § 4-158(a).
198. See id. § 4-159.
199. See id. § 4-160(a).
200. See id. § 4-141.
201. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (Michie 1996) (emphasis added).
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ing appear to be actionable under this statute. However, Alaskan munic-
ipalities are immune from suits "based upon the grant, issuance, refusal,
suspension, delay, or denial of a license, permit, appeal, approval,
exception, variance, or other entitlement, or a rezoning. ' 20 2
The Washington State Constitution succinctly states that the "legis-
lature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may
be brought against the state."2"3 In accordance with that section, Wash-
ington's Legislature enacted a statute tersely abolishing the doctrine of
sovereign immunity: "The state of Washington, whether acting in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising
out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private
person or corporation. ' 2°
A similar rule applies to all local governmental entities.2"5 A
Washington appeals court applied it in Sundberg v. Evans.2 "6 In Sund-
berg, the court held that where the county zoning office negligently mis-
informed a purchaser about a property's zoning classification, the
purchaser might have a cause of action against the county if the pur-
chaser reasonably relied upon the erroneous information.20 7
It would seem logical that the same principles should apply to mis-
information regarding the filing of security interests under the commer-
cial code. Washington, however, has chosen to favor the Director of
Licensing, who is in charge of issuing car title certificates. In direct
contrast to what one would logically expect from Sundberg, the Wash-
ington Legislature declared that "[n]o suit or action shall ever be com-
menced or prosecuted against the director of licensing or the state of
Washington by reason of any act done or omitted to be done in the
administration of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the direc-
tor under this chapter. 20 8
Rhode Island's waiver of sovereign immunity is probably the most
generous in the United States. It provides:
[T]he state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof,
including all cities and towns, shall.., hereby be liable in all actions
of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation;
provided, however, that any recovery in any such action shall not
202. Id. § 09.65.05.70(d)(3). This statute has been held to be an absolute bar to suit regardless
of the possible bad faith of a city or its employees. See J & L Diversified Enters., Inc. v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 736 P.2d 349, 353 (Alaska 1987).
203. WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 26.
204. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (West 1988).
205. See id. § 4.96.010 (West Supp. 1997).
206. 897 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
207. See id. at 1286-89.
208. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.12.200 (West 1987).
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exceed the monetary limitations thereof set forth in the chapter.2 °9
Rhode Island now limits recovery to $100,000 in any one tort
action against any city or town, unless the town or city was engaged in a
proprietary function during the commission of the tort, in which case
this limitation is not applicable.210
Although there do not appear to be any cases applying this act to
the Secretary of State or any other government officer for acts relating to
misinformation about filed security interests, there is at least one relating
to wrongful arrest. In Calhoun v. City of Providence,1 police arrested
a driver and impounded his car pursuant to an arrest warrant for a previ-
ous charge.21 2 Even though the driver vehemently insisted that the arrest
was a mistake and that the previous charges had been resolved, police
held him in jail until the following day, when they discovered that the
driver was correct.213 The driver sued the State and two Rhode Island
cities.214 The driver later dropped his claim against the cities, but con-
tinued his suit against the State. 215 The State asserted that a judge was
responsible for the error.216 The supreme court held that if a judge made
the mistake, then the State would be protected under the rule of judicial
immunity, but that the State never proved this fact.21 7 It found:
Despite the state's protestations to the contrary, the evidence intro-
duced by plaintiff clearly established a prima facie case of negli-
gence .... In so viewing the evidence, there is no question that the
record reasonably supports the inference that plaintiff's arrest, the
loss of his car, and his overnight incarceration all came about because
somebody in the employ of the state "goofed. 218
The court concluded
that the lapse which led to this suit occurred in the clerk's office
where, because of some bookkeeping slip-up, either the issuance of
the capias was never docketed or the recall order was never entered.
The clerk, unlike the judge, is not immune to suit because of his
failure to perform the ministerial functions imposed upon him by
law.219
If the State of Rhode Island is liable for damages to a citizen
209. R.I. Gm. LAws § 9-31-1 (1985).
210. See id. § 9-31-3.
211. 390 A.2d 350 (R.I. 1978).
212. See id. at 351.
213. See id. at 351-52.
214. See id. at 352.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 357.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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because a clerk in the judicial system "goofed" in the handling of
paperwork, then a similar result should follow when a clerk in the Secre-
tary of State's office commits a similar "goof."
Illinois has established a Court of Claims with jurisdiction to hear
"[a]ll claims against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a
like cause of action would lie against a private person or corporation in a
civil suit. ' 220 However, it limits claims in cases not involving motor
vehicles to $100,000.221
The annotations to the Court of Claims statutes indicate that the
court has been a busy one. Unfortunately, no cases dealing with the
subject matter of this Article were found.
Michigan has waived sovereign immunity in a limited number of
areas: defective highways, 222 government-owned vehicles, 223 public
buildings,21 and hospitals.2 25 After this grudging waiver, however, it
re-affirms its older policy on sovereign immunity. It provides:
§ 691.1407. Governmental immunity from tort liability
Sec. 7. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmen-
tal agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein
the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function. Except as otherwise provided in this act, this
act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of
the state from tort liability as it existed before July 1, 1965, which
immunity is affirmed.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard
to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question,
each officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer
acting on behalf of a governmental agency, and each member of a
board, council, commission, or statutorily created task force of a gov-
ernmental agency shall be immune from tort liability for injuries to
persons or damages to property caused by the officer, employee, or
member while in the course of employment or service or volunteer
while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the follow-
ing are met:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reason-
ably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her
authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge
of a governmental function.
220. 705 ILL. Cop. STAT. ANN. 505/8(d) (West Supp. 1997).
221. See id.
222. See MiCm. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1402-.1404 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
223. See id. § 691.1405.
224. See id. § 691.1406.
225. See id. § 691.1407(4).
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(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does
not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the
injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, "gross negligence"
means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of
concern for whether an injury results.2 26
Based on this statute, it appears that simple ministerial negligence
in the filing, recording, or indexing of security interests in personal
property would not support an action against the State and the employee
or officer handling the matter. However, a subsequent statute seems, at
first blush, to waive immunity for state officers, employees, and
agencies.
§ 691.1409. Liability insurance; waiver of defenses
Sec. 9. The purchase of liability insurance to indemnify and protect
governmental agencies against loss or to protect governmental agen-
cies and some or all of its agents, officers, and employees against loss
on account of any judgment secured against it, or them, arising out of
any claim for personal injury or property damage caused by such
governmental agency, its officers, or employees, is authorized, and
all governmental agencies are authorized to pay premiums for the
insurance out of current funds. The existence of any policy of insur-
ance indemnifying any governmental agency against liability for
damages is not a waiver of any defense otherwise available to the
governmental agency in the defense of the claim. 227
The plaintiff in a case against a school district argued that the pro-
curement of insurance ought to be a waiver of the school district's
defense of sovereign immunity, in accordance with the rule in some
states, 228 that if an immune defendant purchases liability insurance it
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. 229 However, the court held
that the plain dictates of section 691.1409 provide otherwise.230 The
court expressed no opinion about the possible defense of any school dis-
trict employees, because none were named in the lower court case.
To the extent that a governmental agency purchases insurance to
protect its officers and employees, the statute seems to be an implicit
recognition that these persons may well be subject to liability for simple
negligence.
If Michigan law bars tort suits against the State for misfiling, mis-
representing, or misindexing financing statements, is it possible to sue
226. Id. § 601.1407.
227. Id. § 691.1409.
228. See R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Liability or Indemnity Insurance Carried by Governmental
Unit as Affecting Immunity from Tort Liability, 68 A.L.R.2d 1437, § 4 (1959).
229. See Pichette v. Manistique Public Schools, 269 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Mich. 1978).
230. See id. at 150.
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the State for breach of contract based upon the payment of the statutory
filing fee in return for the assent of the Secretary to perform a search for
financing statements? The Supreme Court of Michigan has held that
once a request for a filing search has been made, the filing officer has no
choice but to comply with the request and to perform acts required by
statute.231 The Secretary is already bound by official duty to render a
service, hence the payment of money is of no benefit to the State and is
simply a nominal payment for a pre-existing duty. The statutory fee is
not bargained for.232 It thus rejected "the plaintiff's claim that the obli-
gatory payment of a nominal fee for specific and mandatory acts by
governmental agents is sufficient to convert the transaction at issue...
into a contract. 233
Texas requires a party seeking to sue the State to obtain a legisla-
tive resolution granting them permission to do so. 234 Permission does
not constitute an admission of liability, and the State and its agencies
reserve the right to all factual and legal defenses.235
Texas' state-slanted approach also partially protects public servants
by providing:
Except in an action arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States, a public servant, other than a provider of health care
... is not personally liable for damages in excess of $100,000 arising
from personal injury, death, or deprivation of a right, privilege, or
immunity if:
(1) the damages are the result of an act or omission by the public
servant in the course and scope of the public servant's office,
employment, or contractual performance for or service on behalf of a
state agency, institution, department, or local government; and
(2) for the amount not in excess of $100,000, the public servant is
covered:
(A) by the state's obligation to indemnify under Chapter 104;
(B) by a local government's authorization to indemnify under Chap-
ter 102;
(C) by liability or errors and omissions insurance; or
(D) by liability or errors and omissions coverage under an interlocal
agreement. 236
In Texas, the rational person would sue state officers or employees
231. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Department of State, 644 N.W.2d 786, 788 (Mich.
1989).
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. See TEx. Ctv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.001-.005 (West Supp. 1997).
235. See id. § 107.002.
236. Id. § 108.002(a) (West Supp. 1996). An identical provision protects public servants
against liability for property damage. See id. § 108.002(b).
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personally for their acts or omissions, rather than attempt to secure the
state legislature's permission to sue the State.237
The State of Maryland has recently adopted a broad waiver of
immunity statute. The act waives all state immunity for tort claims up to
$100,000 per claimant per incident and only exempts some judicial
actions from the waiver.238
North Dakota's treatment of claims against the State appears to be
quite citizen-oriented:
1. The state may only be held liable for money damages for an injury
proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of
a state employee acting within the employee's scope of employment
under circumstances in which the employee would be personally lia-
ble to a claimant in accordance with the laws of this state, or an
injury caused from some condition or use of tangible property under
circumstances in which the state, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant. No claim may be brought against the state or a state
employee acting within the employee's scope of employment except
a claim authorized under this chapter or otherwise authorized by the
legislative assembly.
2. The liability of the state under this chapter is limited to a total of
two hundred fifty thousand dollars per person and one million dollars
for any number of claims arising from any single occurrence. The
state may not be held liable, or be ordered to indemnify a state
employee held liable, for punitive or exemplary damages. Any
amount of a judgment against the state in excess of the one million
dollar limit adopts an appropriation authorizing payment of all or a
portion of that amount. A claimant may present proof of the judg-
ment to the director of the office of management and budget who
shall include within the proposed budget for the office of manage-
ment and budget a request for payment for the portion of the judg-
ment in excess of the limit under this section at the next regular
session of the legislative assembly after the judgment is rendered.239
This section later provides that neither the State nor its employees
may be held liable for "[a] claim resulting from a decision to undertake
or a refusal to undertake any judicial or quasi judicial act, including a
decision to grant with conditions, to refuse to grant, or to revoke any
license, permit, order, or other administrative approval or denial."
This subsection should not immunize the State for mere negligent filing,
237. For a current review of the Texas cases against government employees, see Jolly v. Klein,
923 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
238. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104 (Supp. 1996).
239. H.B. 1153, 55th Leg. (N.D. 1997) (enacted) (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-
02(1)-(2)).
240. Id. (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-02(3)(d)).
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misindexing, or misinforming about any filing under the commercial
code or motor vehicle laws, because these acts are merely ministerial
and have no connection with any judicial or quasi-judicial activity.
Wisconsin has not waived sovereign immunity in a direct way.
Instead, it has bound itself to indemnify public officers and employees
who are sued as individuals for acts committed within the scope of their
employment?"1 Section (1)(a) of this statute deserves close reading.
(1)(a) If the defendant in any action or special proceeding is a public
officer or employe[e] and is proceeded against in an official capacity
or is proceeded against as an individual because of acts committed
while carrying out duties as an officer or employe[e] and the jury or
the court finds that the defendant was acting within the scope of
employment, the judgment as to damages and costs entered against
the officer or employe[e] in excess of any insurance applicable to the
officer or employe[e] shall be paid by the state or political subdivi-
sion of which the defendant is an officer or employe[e]. Agents of
any department of the state shall be covered by this section while
acting within the scope of their agency. Regardless of the results of
the litigation the governmental unit, if it does not provide legal coun-
sel to the defendant officer or employe[e], shall pay reasonable attor-
ney fees and costs of defending the action, unless it is found by the
court or jury that the defendant officer or employe[e] did not act
within the scope of employment. The duty of a governmental unit to
provide or pay for the provision of legal representation does not
apply to the extent that applicable insurance provides that representa-
tion. If the employing state agency or the attorney general denies that
the state officer, employe[e] or agent was doing any act growing out
of or committed in the course of the discharge of his or her duties, the
attorney general may appear on behalf of the state to contest that
issue without waiving the state's sovereign immunity to suit. Failure
by the officer or employe[e] to give notice to his or her department
head of an action or special proceeding commenced against the
defendant officer or employe[e] as soon as reasonably possible is a
bar to recovery by the officer or employe[e] from the state or political
subdivision of reasonable attorney fees and costs of defending the
action. The attorney fees and expenses shall not be recoverable if the
state or political subdivision offers the officer or employe[e] legal
counsel and the offer is refused by the defendant officer or
employe[e]. If the officer, employe[e] or agent of the state refuses to
cooperate in the defense of the litigation, the officer, employee or
agent is not eligible for any indemnification or for the provision of
legal counsel by the governmental unit under this section.? 2
241. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (West 1997).
242. Id.
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Wisconsin courts have held that even though the State or its agen-
cies may be immune from suit, state officers or employees may not be
immune.
The general rule in Wisconsin is that a state officer or employee "is
immune from personal liability for injuries resulting from acts per-
formed within the scope of the individual's public office. There are
three exceptions to the rule of state-officer/employee immunity: (1)
where the conduct causing the injury is malicious, willful or inten-
tional; (2) where the injury results from the negligent performance of
a "ministerial" duty; and (3) where the officer or employee is aware
of a danger of such quality or magnitude that he or she has an "abso-
lute, certain and imperative" duty to act and does not.243
Alabama's constitution succinctly provides "[t]hat the State of Ala-
bama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." 24
The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state officers and employ-
ees, in their official capacities and individually, are absolutely immune
from suit when the action is, in effect, one against the State.2 45
On the other hand, no state officer or employee can escape individ-
ual tort liability by asserting that his mere status as a state official cloaks
him with the State's constitutional immunity. The individual official is
immune only from liability for negligent discretionary, rather than min-
isterial, acts.' In Williams v. Madison County Board of Health,247 for
example, the court held that the county Board of Health, as a state
agency, was immune from suit, but that an employee, who incorrectly
reported that a new house's septic tank system had been approved,
would be liable for his alleged negligence, even though he had since
retired, because his was a ministerial, not a discretionary, act.24 8
The same result should follow if an employee, not an officer, of the
State incorrectly reports an absence of automobile liens or security inter-
ests under Article 9 of the commercial code.
Virginia is another state which seems to have a relatively broad
243. Walker v. University of Wis. Hosps., 542 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (citation
omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has defined "ministerial" to mean "absolute, certain and
imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes
and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing
remains for [the exercise of] judgment or discretion." Id. (quoting K.L. v. Hinickle, 423 N.W.2d
528, 530 (Wis. 1988)).
244. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
245. See Ex parte Franklin County Dep't of Human Resources, 674 So. 2d 1277 (Ala. 1996);
Shoals Community College v. Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (discussing
application of Alabama's sovereign immunity laws to agencies and individuals).
246. See Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Ala. 1992).
247. 523 So. 2d 453 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988).
248. See id. at 455.
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waiver of sovereign immunity. Its Tort Claims Act" 9 allows claims for
damages caused by "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee while acting within the scope of his employment under cir-
cumstances where the Commonwealth or transportation district, if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss,
injury or death." 0 The Act also limits the amount recoverable by any
claimant depending on when the cause of action accrued and the state
employee's maximum liability coverage.25'
The Supreme Court of Virginia, without the aid of a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity, held that a circuit court clerk would be
liable for negligent ministerial acts.152 In First Virginia Bank-Colonial
v. Baker, a clerk's office employee misfiled a mortgage, leading a credi-
tor to believe it was giving the property owners a second mortgage,
when, in fact, it was their third.2 53 The court stressed that the circuit
court clerk was bonded and that the bond extended to the clerk's
employees.254
In contrast, cases decided under the Tort Claims Act seem to take a
very narrow view of the extent of State and state employee liability for
acts of simple negligence. For example, a federal court has held that a
local school board and the teachers in that district were exempt from
liability for their alleged failure to protect a female student from sexual
attack by a fellow student.2 55 Similarly, another court held that a state-
employed doctor was covered by sovereign immunity where state rules
dictated most of his treatment methods, limiting his discretion. 5 6
Oregon has nicely articulated a general waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, which contemporaneously immunizes state employees from liabil-
ity for acts within the scope of their employment or duties . 5 7 It
provides that:
[s]ubject to the limitations of [Oregon law], every public body is sub-
ject to action or suit for its torts and those of its officers, employees
and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties,
whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function or
while operating a motor vehicle in a ride sharing arrangement ....
The sole cause of action for any tort of officers, employees or agents
of a public body acting within the scope of their employment or
249. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to .9 (Michie 1992).
250. Id. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie Supp. 1996).
251. See id.
252. See First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 301 S.E.2d 8 (Va. 1983).
253. See id. at 10.
254. See id. at 13.
255. See B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560, 573-74 (E.D. Va. 1993).
256. See Lohr v. Larsen, 431 S.E.2d 642, 645-46 (Va. 1993).
257. See OR. REv. STAT. § 30-265 (1995).
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duties and eligible for representation and indemnification under [Ore-
gon law] shall be an action against the public body only.258
The statute then enumerates six areas of immunity, but none of
them touch upon the subject matter of this Article.25 9 Therefore, it
appears that the State would be liable for negligent mistakes in the
recording of liens and security interests.
Interestingly, an Oregon appellate court held that a building inspec-
tor and the State would be liable to an applicant for a building permit
when the inspector allegedly negligently issued the permit and then
another inspector revoked it. The inspector argued that the Uniform
Building Code relieves those enforcing the code of personal liability for
acts and omissions in discharging their duties, but the court held that an
earlier version of the tort claims act superseded the Uniform Building
Code immunity provision and that the State and the inspector were
liable.260
The State of Missouri has chosen to give its waiver of sovereign
immunity statute a very narrow scope.26' In a recent case, police
arrested a Missouri motorist after a computer erroneously indicated that
his driver's license had been revoked.262 When the motorist sued the
Department of Revenue employees responsible for processing his
records, the court held that "[t]he State of Missouri enjoys sovereign
immunity as existed at common law except for tort claims arising from
the negligent operation of motor vehicles by public employees and from
the dangerous condition of public entity's property if and to the extent
that the public entity has acquired liability insurance."263 According to
the court, when state employees are sued in their official capacity, they
enjoy the same immunity.26
The Kansas Tort Claims Act265 covers employees' negligent acts or
omissions. It provides that "each governmental entity shall be liable for
damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of
its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under
circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would
be liable under the laws of this state. 266 There are nineteen exceptions
to the above immunity rule, one of which is the exercise of "judicial
258. Id. § 30-265(1). The statute also provides that public bodies are immune from liability
when the officers, employees or agents who caused the injury are immune. See id. § 30-265(2).
259. See id. § 30-265(3).
260. See Dykeman v. State, 593 P.2d 1183, 1187 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
261. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.600 (West Supp. 1997).
262. See Edwards v. McNeill, 894 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
263. ld. at 682.
264. See id.
265. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to -6115 (1989).
266. Id. § 75-6103(a).
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function. '2 67 However, if the court determines that the "function" at
issue is "ministerial" rather than "judicial," a finding of liability is still
possible.268 In Cook v. City of Topeka, for example, the court held a
clerk liable because failure to recall a stale arrest warrant was a ministe-
rial function, not a judicial one. 269
In 1991, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that a county treasurer
and the state Department of Revenue could be liable for negligence for
failing to record a lien on an automobile title certificate. 270 The court
noted that there is liability at common law for land transfer recorders
who make recording or indexing mistakes, and that this liability extends
to transfers of personal property. 271
In 1977, North Carolina amended its tort claims act, making the
State liable for both acts and omissions of its employees in a fashion
similar to Kansas' approach. The act creates the Industrial Commission
to hear all claims against State departments and agencies to
determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of
the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent
of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment,
service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of
North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If the Commission finds
that there was such negligence on the part of an officer, employee,
involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the
scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, which
was the proximate cause of the injury and that there was no contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose
behalf the claim is asserted, the Commission shall determine the
amount of damages which the claimant is entitled to be paid, includ-
ing medical and other expenses, and by appropriate order direct the
payment of such damages by the department, institution or agency
concerned, but in no event shall the amount of damages awarded
exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) cumula-
tively to all claimants on account of injury and damage to any one
person.27
2
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina has interpreted this statute
to mean that the State of North Carolina and its agencies can plead sov-
ereign immunity in a tort suit unless the State has consented to be sued
267. Id. § 75-6104(b).
268. See Cook v. City of Topeka, 654 P.2d 953, 962 (Kan. 1982).
269. See id.
270. Mid Am. Credit Union v. Board of County Comm'rs, 806 P.2d 479, 483-84 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1991).
271. See id.
272. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1993).
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or waived its right to plead sovereign immunity by the purchase of lia-
bility insurance.273 The court of appeals has also construed this statute
as imposing liability upon the State regardless of whether the claim
arose out of a governmental, proprietary, or discretionary function.274
Unlike most of the acts this Article surveys, North Carolina's act
excludes no particular state functions from liability. Therefore, the State
probably would be liable for negligence in furnishing information under
the commercial code.
Although North Carolina state officers are immune from personal
liability for mere negligence, their negligence may subject the State to
liability as determined by the state's Industrial Commission or the court
system through a third-party complaint for contribution or indemnifica-
tion.27 In Columbus County Auto Auction, Inc. v. Aycock Auction Co.,
for example, the defendants relied on the third-party approach.276 In
that case, the Department of Motor Vehicles was allegedly negligent in
issuing title certificates, causing losses to car dealerships.277 The court
allowed the defendant dealerships to bring the Department of Motor
Vehicles in through a claim for indemnification. 278
The Maine Tort Claim Act's2 79 "Exceptions to immunity ' 2 ° and
"Immunity notwithstanding waiver ' '28 1 provisions are so narrow that
there does not appear to be any state liability for the Secretary of State's
simple negligence in the filing, indexing, or reporting of financing state-
ments under the commercial code. On the other hand, another section
indicates that the Secretary or his clerks might be personally liable for a
limited amount.282 It provides that a governmental entity's personal lia-
bility "for negligent acts or omissions within the course and scope of
employment shall be subject to a limit of $10,000 for any such claims
arising out of a single occurrence and the employee is not liable for any
amount in excess of that limit on any such claims. 283
The terseness of Washington's waiver of sovereign imunity284 is
273. See EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 422 S.E.2d
338, 340 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
274. See Zimmer v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 360 S.E.2d 115, 117 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987).
275. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1993); Columbus County Auto Auction, Inc. v. Aycock
Auction Co., 368 S.E.2d 888, 890 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
276. See id. at 889.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 890.
279. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8101-8118 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
280. See id. at tit. 14. § 8104-A (West Supp. 1996).
281. See id. § 8104-B.
282. See id. § 8104-D.
283. Id.
284. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
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rivaled only by the Louisiana Constitution, which declares that
"[n]either the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be
immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or
property." 285 A 1995 amendment narrowed the wide scope of this con-
stitutional provision by giving the Legislature the power to "limit or
provide for the extent of liability of the state, a state agency, or a polit-
ical subdivision in all cases, including the circumstances giving rise to
liability and the kinds and amounts of recoverable damages. '286 There
does not appear to be any legislation governing recording errors.
New Hampshire defines a claim as "any request for monetary
relief' for:
[b]odily injury, personal injury, death or property damages caused by
the failure of the state or state officers, trustees, officials, employees,
or members of the general court to follow the appropriate standard of
care when that duty was owed to the person making the claim,
including any right of action for money damages which either
expressly or by implication arises from any law, unless another rem-
edy for such claim is expressly provided by law. 287
Relatively small claims under New Hampshire's tort claims act
must be submitted to the state's five-person Board of Claims.28 The
Board consists of two persons appointed by the Governor, a chairperson
appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court, one person
appointed by the president of the senate, and one person appointed by
the speaker of the house.28 9 The Board has original and exclusive juris-
diction over claims in excess of $5000.29 0 It has concurrent jurisdiction
with the superior court over claims in excess of $5000, but not exceed-
ing $50,000.21 The superior court has original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all claims in excess of $50,000.292
The State of Illinois, like New York and Ohio, has established a
Court of Claims which has jurisdiction to hear "[a]ll claims against the
State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action
would lie against a private person or corporation in a civil suit. '293 An
award under this act may not exceed $100,000, except in cases involving
285. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10(A).
286. Id. art. 12. § 10(C).
287. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:1(H-a)(a) (Supp. 1996). A state employee or official's
"request for monetary relief' for property damage incurred "on state business" also constitutes a
claim. See id. § 541-B: l(II-a)(b).
288. See id. § 541-B:9(II).
289. See id. § 541-B:3.
290. See id. § 541-B:9(II).
291. See id. § 541-B:9(III).
292. See id. § 541-B:9(IV).
293. 705 IL. COMP STAT. ANN. 505/8(d) (West Supp. 1997).
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the operation of state-owned, leased or controlled vehicles.294
There appear to be no cases in Illinois dealing with misfiling, mis-
indexing, or misinforming, and vehicle liens or article nine security
interests under the commercial code. However, the Legislature has
sought to protect local public entities from liability for injuries
caused by the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization where the
entity or its employee is authorized by enactment to determine
whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied, sus-
pended or revoked.2 95
Additionally, it exempts local public entities from liability for injuries
"caused by an oral promise or misrepresentation of [their] employees,
whether or not such promise or misrepresentation was negligent or
intentional. ' 296
These provisions seem to discourage the issuance of written state-
ments. Under the first provision, it appears that if the certificate issu-
ance is mandatory, the issuing entity would be liable for any mistakes a
certificate contained. The second provision, however, indicates that
public entities would not be liable for oral mistakes.
V. STATES WHICH HAVE AMENDED THEIR COMMERCIAL CODES AND
MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS TO DEFEAT LIABILITY
Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Secretary of State297 is a classic
case of negligence. In Borg Warner, a lender requested that the Secre-
tary's office search for financing statements listing certain debtors on
seven separate occasions.298 The Secretary's office repeatedly reported
no filed security interests when, in fact, there were.299 Two officers of
the Secretary of State's office admitted that had they gone to the cross
references, they would have discovered the long-standing financing
statement.3" The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment
against the Secretary of State.3 °1
Two cases suggest that if a recording office used a computer to
conduct searches and a minor misspelling led to searcher error, it would
294. See id.
295. 745 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 10/2-104 (West 1993).
296. Id. 10/2-106.
297. 731 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1987).
298. See id. at 303-04.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 305.
301. See id. at 306.
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not be negligence.3 °2 However, the question remains: if the recording
office uses computers and does not have a cross-indexing system, would
not this, in itself, constitute negligence? 30 3
Subsequent to Borg Warner, Kansas amended its commercial code
to provide that "[e]xcept with respect to willful misconduct, the state,
counties and filing officers, and their employees and agents, are immune
from liability for damages resulting from errors or omissions in informa-
tion supplied pursuant to this section." 3 4 Of course, this amendment
essentially overturns Borg Warner.
Section 554.9407 of the Iowa Code provides that: "Except with
respect to willful misconduct, the state of Iowa, the secretary of state, a
county, county recorder and their employees and agents are immune
from liability as a result of errors or omissions in information supplied
pursuant to this subsection. ' 30 5
In addition, section 554.10105 reads:
The secretary of state, the secretary's employees or agents, are
hereby exempted from all personal liability as a result of errors or
omissions in the performance of any duty required by the Uniform
Commercial Code, chapter 554, except in cases of willful negligence.
In the event of such error or omission the state of Iowa shall be
liable in respect to such claims in the same manner, and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances.
Immunity of the state from suit and liability in such case is
waived to the extent provided in chapter 669 and said chapter shall
govern the extent of liability and the practice and procedure neces-
sary to establish any liability of the state.3 °6
Interestingly, section 554.9407 is narrowly drawn to protect state
employees from liability for errors in the supplying of information,
while section 554.10105 covers "errors or omissions in the performance
of any duty required by the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 7 such as
errors in filing and indexing, as well as errors in furnishing information.
Kentucky follows the latter approach, but uses different language.
Its act provides that "[n]either the filing officer nor any employee of the
filing officer shall be personally liable for any damages which may arise
due to information furnished pursuant to this section which is subse-
302. See In re McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc., 51 B.R. 511 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re
Tyler, 23 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
303. See, e.g., In re Mines Tire Co., 194 B.R. 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996); In re PA Record
Outlet, Inc. 92 B.R. 139 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla.
1975).
304. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-407(3) (1996).
305. IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9407 (West 1995).
306. Id. § 554.10105.
307. Id.
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quently shown to be inaccurate. 30 8
It should be noted that the Kentucky statute does not purport to
immunize the State from liability as the former Iowa statute did. More-
over, it appears that Kentucky grants a broader immunity to its local
governments than most other states. For example, one section provides
that "a local government shall not be liable for injuries or losses result-
ing from... [t]he issuance, denial, suspension, revocation of, or failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certifi-
cate, approval, order or similar authorization. 30 9
Wisconsin also follows this narrow approach. Its statutes provide
that "[n]o filing officer nor any of the filing officer's employes [sic] or
agents shall be subject to personal liability by reason of any error or
omission in the performance of any duty under [this chapter] except in
case of misconduct. 310
The State of Delaware seems to be very concerned about liability
for filing errors. For example, it amended section 9-401 of its commer-
cial code by adding a subsection which states:
Notwithstanding that any writing authorized to be filed with the Sec-
retary of State under this title is when filed inaccurately, defectively
or erroneously executed, or otherwise defective in any respect,
neither the Secretary of State nor any filing officer shall have any
liability to any person for the acceptance for filing or the filing and
indexing of such writing by the Secretary of State.31
In addition, section 9-407 of Delaware's commercial code imposes
new duties on filing officers, but simultaneously takes away any outside
sanction for failure to perform these duties:
At the time of the presentation for filing of an original financing
statement or a continuation statement, the person presenting such
statement may request the filing officer to mail to the secured party of
record at its address of record or to any other specified person a
notice setting forth the date that the effectiveness of such original
financing statement or continuation statement, as the case may be,
shall lapse. Such notice shall be deposited in the mail by a filing
officer not earlier than six months, nor later than four months prior to
the date such effectiveness shall lapse. Notwithstanding the forego-
ing, neither the Secretary of State nor any filing officer shall have any
liability to any person for any failure by a filing officer to mail timely
or properly the notice described in this subsection ... 312
308. Ky. REv. STAT. AN. § 355.9-407(3) (Michie 1996).
309. Id. § 65.2003(3)(c) (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
310. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 409.407(3) (West 1995).
311. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-401(6) (1993).
312. Id. § 9-407(6).
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Under Delaware's Tort Claims Act,3 3 certain public officials are
absolutely immune from suit, while others, such as public defenders and
the Secretary of State, are immune so long as they perform "without
gross or wanton negligence. 31 4 Of course, under this approach, a sim-
ple act of misfiling, misindexing, or misinforming would not be suffi-
cient to allow recovery from a recording office, whether state or local.
VI. STATES WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE RETAINED SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR RECORDING ERRORS
At first glance, New Mexico's Tort Claims Act 31 5 seems to provide
one of the most liberal waivers of sovereign immunity in the United
States.316 In addition, it limits recovery to a maximum of $100,000 for
property damage arising out of a single occurrence; $400,000 per person
for all damages, other than property damage or medical expenses, aris-
ing out of a single occurrence; and $750,000 for all claims, other than
medical expenses, arising out of a single occurrence.317 The Act
requires governmental entities to insure themselves to cover the full
extent of their potential liability.31 8
Unfortunately, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, after articulating
what appears to be a broad waiver of immunity, then provides that "[a]
governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the
scope of duty are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as
waived by [this Act]. 319 No section of the Act seems to waive sover-
eign immunity for negligent acts of the Secretary of State or others com-
mitted while filing, indexing, or reporting financing statements.
In Wyoming, a governmental entity is liable for bodily injury,
wrongful death, or property damage caused by the negligence of public
employees acting within the scope of their duties operating motor vehi-
cles, aircraft, watercraft,320 buildings, recreation areas, public parks,321
airports, 32 2 and public utilities, 323 and providing health care. 324 Govern-
mental entities are also liable for the tortious conduct of peace
313. Id. at tit. 10, §§ 4001-4013 (Supp. 1996).
314. See id. § 4001(3); see also Vick v. Hailer, 512 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 514
A.2d 482 (Del. 1986).
315. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -27 (Michie Supp. 1996).
316. Id. § 41-4-2.
317. See id. § 41-4-19.
318. See id. § 41-4-20.
319. Id. § 41-4-4.A.
320. See Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-105 (Michie 1996).
321. See id. § 1-39-106.
322. See id. § 1-39-107.
323. See id. § 1-39-108.
324. See id. § 1-39-109 to -110.
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officers.325 With the exception of the foregoing activities, governmental
immunity is still in effect.
Pennsylvania has grudgingly given a very narrow waiver of sover-
eign immunity, which indicates that the State would not be liable for the
Secretary of State's negligent handling of UCC records and motor vehi-
cle title certificates. 26 It waives immunity for negligence involving
motor vehicles, health care, care of personal property, state property,
handling of animals, liquor store sales, National Guard activities, tox-
oids, and vaccines.327
The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act 328 provides that "[a]
public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury
which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the
type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant. '329 Olsen
and Brown v. City of Englewood330 is an example of how Colorado
courts interpret this clause. In Olsen, a law firm sued a city for termina-
tion without cause of an attorney-client relationship, alleging that it had
relied upon a misrepresentation by the city.331 The court held that such a
claim sounded in either negligent or intentional misrepresentation-
torts-and, therefore, the city was immune under the Act.33
2
Lehman v. City of Louisville333 also applied section 24-10-106 of
the Governmental Immunity Act. In Lehman, the plaintiffs alleged that
they had told the Director of Community Development about their
intended use of an existing building, that the Director told them that
their proposed use was in conformity with the existing building code,
and that they had relied upon this statement and purchased and reno-
vated the building.334 Later, the Director stated that their intended use
violated the building code, and the purchasers sued the city. 335 As in
Olsen, the court held that the plaintiff's claim was based upon negligent
or intentional misrepresentations-torts-and that their claims were
barred by the city's sovereign immunity.336
Based upon these two cases, it appears that any claim of misrepre-
325. See id. § 1-39-112.
326. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
327. See id.
328. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-101 to -120 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
329. Id. § 24-10-106(1) (West Supp. 1996).
330. 867 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), aftid, 889 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1995).
331. See id. at 97, 100.
332. See id. at 100.
333. 857 P.2d 455 (Col. Ct. App. 1993).
334. See id. at 456.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 457.
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sentation against the Secretary of State or other officer regarding the
filing of prior security interests would be barred.
VII. CONCLUSION
Now, with the renaissance of the "king can do no wrong" concept,
what can citizens do to protect themselves from the king's servants'
"misrepresentations," "deceits," and just plain, simple negligent han-
dling of financing statements and lien notices?
A few suggestions may be helpful:
1. Lenders who file financing statements by mail should keep a
"tickler" file to remind themselves to examine returned financing state-
ments for proper filing. If filing papers fail to return within a reasonable
time, the filers should examine their cancelled checks to see if the state
has deposited the filing fee.
2. State and local law permitting, lenders should enlist private cor-
porations to file and examine records for them, as a check on the state's
civil servants. This would be particularly important when the filing
office is located at a distance from the filer.
3. Lenders should file by fax, which is permitted in over twenty
percent of the states. However, filers must prove that the state received
their filing.
4. If the economics of the transaction warrant it, it might be pru-
dent to conduct a search a week or so after filing of the financing state-
ment or car title application to make sure that filing has, in fact, been
made and that the government office has properly indexed the financing
statement. If the volume of motor vehicle cases is any indication of a
nationwide problem, a search would seem particularly appropriate.
5. Some states have provided for electronic filing of commercial
documents.337 Even the small merchant and lender should consider this
337. The federal Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified in
scattered sections of titles 15, 18, 19, & 42 U.S.C.), directed the United States Transportation
Department to establish an electronic information system to enable state authorities to check to
determine if a motor vehicle had been stolen before the state issued a new title certificate. See id.
§ 202. The system was scheduled to begin operating by January, 1996. See id. § 202(a)(1).
The Anti-Car Theft Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-152, 110 Stat. 1384 (codified
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), was recently enacted to improve the 1992 Act. The 1996
Improvements Act transfers enforcement of the Act from the Transportation Department to the
Justice Department. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 30502 (1997). In addition, the Improvements Act creates
two immunity sections. It amends section 30502 of title 49, U.S.C., by adding the following:
(f) Immunity.-Any person performing any activity under this section or
sections 30503 or 30504 in good faith and with the reasonable belief that such
activity was in accordance with this section or section 30503 or 30504, as the case
may be, shall be immune from any civil action respecting such activity which is
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relatively new method. Of course, human error, on the part of the filer
and the receiver, have to be reckoned with in this area also.
seeking money damages or equitable relief in any court of the United States or a
State.
Id. § 30502. It amends section 33109 of title 49, U.S.C., by adding the following:
(d) Immunity.-Any person performing any activity under this section or sec-
tion 33110 or 33111 in good faith and with the reasonable belief that such activity
was in accordance with such section shall be immune from any civil action respect-
ing such activity which is seeking money damages or equitable relief in any court of
the United States or a State.
Id. § 33109.
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